Official Politics

For elected officials, there is a line between official duties and political activity. But there is one area that is greyer than others in that distinction: party activity.

Party activity is focused on political positioning, message coordination, and advancing a party's agenda by winning votes. Much of these activities can be more efficiently achieved through the web. Further still, the best means to reach the narrow target band is by establishing an intranet. The Senate Republican Conference appears to have fully embraced intranet technology and associate applications, impressing Nielsen and generating buzz through innovative incorporation of mobile technology. Deep in content and features, the Conference site is a standard bearer for online party activity in the Congress.

Intranets are tricky, though. Politically sensitive information involving legislative strategy and policy positions is not information that either party would desire to be available for public consumption, yet it is crucial for effective party activity. Intranets are thus an ideal tool to reach a limited and relatively secure and known audience. However, the taxpayers foot the bill for the official expenses of this activity. Is there an obligation for to maintain public access to all party building activities conducted at the taxpayer's expense?

Where Does the Data Go?

Campaigns are a snapshot in time. But the information that campaigns capture is highly valuable, and its value lasts well beyond the efforts of any single campaign. Modern campaigns utilize marketing and voter turnout techniques that are premised on access to loads of information. Therefore, continued access to this data is crucial if the Parties don't wish to continuously recreate efforts of the past.

The strategic importance of data continuity should be the placed above all other operational considerations faced by political parties. Data continuity feeds fundraising, maintains structures and volunteer organizations, and provides a foundation for introspective research and polling.

While the Bush campaign leveraged the RNC's data warehouse in 2004, tons of data was gathered by America Coming Together to help turn out the Democratic vote. So what happened to all of ACT's data on November 3rd? They can't simply give it to the DNC, nor can they store it in anticipation of giving it to the campaign of the 2008 contender (or any congressional candidates in the meantime). The current regulatory structure basically leaves an organization such as ACT with two options: fold up the tents and go home, or serve as a GOTV operation for democratic candidates in perpetuity.

ACT isn't going anywhere. For the Democrats, that means a continued challenge to achieve synergy among disparate and legally firewalled groups.

Ohio Thoughts

I'm an Ohio native, and made it back to the State frequently prior to 11/02/2004. My impressions of life and activities in the battleground state of the 2004 Presidential Election vary, but they add some validation to the course material.

In one of the most complex and consequential Get Out The Vote efforts in the history of electoral politics, the poor citizens of the state of Ohio drank from a fire hose of campaign activity. There were ads, and the ads were inescapable. On your radio, in your mailbox, several times during each television commercial break. And when the mail man had come and gone, and you sat in silence, the telephone calls would begin. I always wondered who these "undecideds" were that were supposed to be the difference. You could not help but decide when bombarded like that, even if it were based simply upon who bothered you less.

In Columbus, ACT was everywhere. "Volunteers", mostly plucked from campus for an attractive hourly wage, were visible at most busy street corners. I don't know who they were persuading, though. It all seemed kind of aimless, and it was mostly anti-Bush rather than having anything to do with John Kerry.

I spent the week before the election in Southeastern Ohio, straddling the Republican-leaning rural communities and the staunchly Democratic decaying industrial cities on the Ohio river. There, as part of the Bush campaign, I saw the organization of local volunteers that was marshaled and deployed in the final push ahead of the election. There was no downtime. Call lists needed completed, door knocking started at 9am, and there was always literature to be dropped. ACT was there too, but they were outnumbered. The Bush campaign focused on the appeals most likely to resonate with the culturally conservative segments of the population, highlighting in particular the 2nd Amendment, gay marriage, and abortion.

The Bush campaign in SE Ohio was in frequent contact with headquarters, providing information upstream and reassessing targets and duties based on quality feedback.

With all the rhetorical energy from the defeat-Bush camp, I was surprised to read the accounts of outright incompetence. A little aimless and disjointed was the impression that I got. With the resources poured into the state, there should not have been an opportunity for gross incompetence on either side.

What Gets You Fired Up?

This spot has discussed the RNC's Voter Vault system and the DNC's comparable DataMart/Demzilla structure. These sophisticated database technologies allow campaigns to identify, track, target, and communicate with voters. Supplemented by commercially available consumer data, these systems are the engine that drives the Parties' voter identification and motivation efforts.

Bush/Cheney 2004 campaign strategist Matthew Dowd estimated that because of their focus on data collection, the campaign was able to “quadruple the number” of Republican voters who could be targeted through direct mail, telemarketing, and door-to-door visits.

Republican strategic architect Karl Rove began his political consulting career in the direct mail business, gaining a deep understanding of how targeted population segments could be motivated by narrowcast messaging.

Narrowcasting, or micro targeting as it is alternately called, was essential to the 2004 Republican strategy. In a tight election, narrowcasting provided the best opportunity to cherry-pick prospective Republicans who lived in majority Democratic neighborhoods. The most noteworthy example of the Republican narrowcasting efforts in 2004 was the RNC's contract with TargetPoint Consulting. According to the Washington Post, TargetPoint was able to

“Delve into commercial databases that pinpointed consumer buying patterns and television-watching habits to unearth such information as Coors beer and bourbon drinkers skewing Republican, brandy and cognac drinkers tilting Democratic; college football TV viewers were more Republican than those who watch professional football; viewers of Fox News were overwhelmingly committed to vote for Bush; homes with telephone caller ID tended to be Republican; people interested in gambling, fashion and theater tended to be Democratic.

Surveys of people on these consumer data lists were then used to determine "anger points" (late-term abortion, trial lawyer fees, estate taxes) that coincided with the Bush agenda for as many as 32 categories of voters, each identifiable by income, magazine subscriptions, favorite television shows and other "flags." Merging this data, in turn, enabled those running direct mail, precinct walking and phone bank programs to target each voter with a tailored message.”

Wherever possible, the Bush/Cheney campaign attempted to exploit these individual issue biases and convert them into votes on Election Day. The strategy enabled the campaign to target individuals and households in a manner never before experienced in a presidential campaign. The Republican strategy would not have been possible, however, without loads of data and effective centralized control functions.

Structurally Unsound

The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) ushered in a new era and dramatically altered the landscape of the 2004 election cycle, particularly as it related to the Presidential ticket.

BCRA "banned" the soft money donations that the Democratic Party had relied so heavily upon for fundraising. Despite this, the effort to elect a Democratic candidate transitioned remarkably smoothly into this new era. The smooth transition is owed to the shadow Democratic Party, which included various 527 organizations, all of whom had specific tasks for the 2004 election. America Votes served as an umbrella organization of progressive entities determined to defeat George W. Bush. America Coming Together (ACT) was formed to focus on Get Out The Vote efforts. The Media Fund focused on broadcasting advertisements in support of the Democrat effort. The Thunder Road Group was a "rapid response organization" engaged in supporting the Democratic candidate. Finally, the Joint Victory Campaign served as a combined fundraising committee supporting the Democratic candidate.

While many other 527 organizations from across the political spectrum threw their weight behind each candidate in 2004, the efforts of the shadow Democratic party are the most important to dissect when conducting a post-mortem of the 2004 election.

It was assumed that any Democrat challenger would be at a financial disadvantage against the incumbent president. This financial gap would have to be bridged, and it was widely accepted that hard money donations to the candidate and the Democratic Party could not achieve that. That was where the shadow party stepped forward, filling the gap by virtue of 527 organizations' ability to raise unlimited amounts of soft money. As a result, many of the traditional Party functions dedicated to the election of a Democratic candidate were ceded to 527 organizations. ACT in particular served as the primary engine behind Democratic GOTV efforts in key battleground states such as Ohio.

It can be argued (and disputed) that the involvement of groups such as ACT was absolutely necessary in order for the Democratic candidate to compete on even ground with the Bush/Cheney campaign, but Democratic reliance on outside organizations to turn out the vote was a striking structural deficiency in the effort to elect John Kerry.

Because BCRA prohibited coordination between the official Kerry campaign and the DNC on one side, and ACT and the other 527s on the other, there was an inherent disconnect between the official campaign organizations and their ground operations. This disconnect was more profound when compared to the fully integrated, "centralized localization" strategy implemented by the Bush campaign that culminated in the 72 hour project.

In fact, it is a wonder (and a bit curious) that ACT and the Kerry campaign were able to function as seamlessly as they did.

Synergy is so important to electoral success. But this concept of synergy should not be restricted to merely online and offline strategies, but should encompass all efforts that serve to elect a candidate. For Kerry, true synergy was, by law, unachievable based on the structure of the Democratic campaign and its reliance on 527 organizations to GOTV.

New Tricks

I have never utilized RSS or webfeeds. I use Drudge as my information salt lick, and dig through the stacks of stories on various online news outlets when I have the time. By tomorrow, I will be loading my plate with webfeeds, and I anticipate that life may be a little easier because of it.

Amy Gahran does a great service to the uninitiated in her concise 12 part coverage of all things webfeed. Among the highlights of webfeeds are the ability to manage information overload, clean up the clutter, and provide an internet communication tool without the spam.

The applications for campaigns are striking, particular when you consider the practical drawbacks of email newsletters (such as overly restrictive spam filters and cluttered inboxes).

Webfeeds also get beyond two key quandaries associated with email newsletters. The first is frequency. Webfeeds are always there, and though information is pushed to the user, it is ultimately at the user's discretion as to when the information is viewed.

The second is relevancy. With webfeeds information can be updated continuously and thus maintains relevance. Email newsletters pose a risk of arriving with stale information. Stale information is at best a nuisance.

Webfeeds haven't exploded yet, but they will.

It's Contagious

The influentials are out there. Convince the influentials, and you're on your way toward critical mass.

They'll carry your message, supplement marketing efforts, generate buzz, and do all of this with a local and friendly flavor.

If a campaign's online success depends on the number of influentials working on its behalf, the organization must either strive to engage a high percentage of the Online Political Citizens, or allow those that aren't typically influentials to act as though they are. The best way to achieve the latter is through humor.

Nothing spreads on the internet like humor, and unlike most political discourse, its distribution travels uninhibited across ideological lines. Laughter is contagious, and humor's cascade effect on the internet is real and powerful.

Preaching CLV and CRM

Costumer Relationship Management has been discussed here, and will continue to get its proper due in this spot. In order to compete as a major commercial organization it is essential to employ a strong, granular, customer and contact tracking system.

The idea is basic. Know your customer's history. Know the type and number of products purchased. Know the number and nature of billing disputes lodged. Know (and document centrally so that it's readily accessible) anything that can possibly improve the relationship with the customer. This is the objective of 21st century customer service, and applies directly, perhaps even more appropriately, to political campaigns.

There is an increased focus in the commercial world on the idea of achieving the greatest possible Customer Lifetime Value (CLV). The concept of CLV should be the heart of a coordinated political fundraising effort. Finite time and regulated limits allow for specific goals to be incorporated into political fundraising CLVs. The emphasis on fostering loyalty is extremely important to any politician who's in it for the long haul.

CRM software provides the ability to relate to each voter or donor as an individual, based on a real history. It also enables a campaign to track macro trends across all voters or donors that it comes into contact with. This is crucial in quickly identifying and responding to common problems and complaints.

Sign Up Here!

There is a clear distinction between official activity and campaign activity, or at least that's the way it is supposed to be.

Electronic communications have changed the way political and official activity interact with one another and the voters. Websites are undoubtedly marketing tools for an incumbent's accomplishments or positions. Email newsletters allow incumbents to reach directly to constituents (and voters) with issue messaging.

In late 2003, the House amended its official regulations to address and define the acceptable use of email newsletters. These regulations apply permission-based marketing concepts and allow legitimate email communications to those who have solicited them.

In the Senate the rules are more restrictive, to the point of not allowing websites to be updated 60 days in advance of a primary or general election (with certain exceptions).

While cost is not a barrier to political competition as it relates to email newsletters, access to data is. To that end, incumbents have a huge advantage based on their ability to gather high quality email address data from interested constituents (or, again, voters). Rules prohibiting personal attacks and political activity still govern the content of all official communications, but the ability to reach potential voters by use of targeted email newsletters in a clear advantage of incumbency.

Is It Such an Inconvenience to Skip Over or Delete?

Nielson's analysis of Bush and Kerry's email newsletters is interesting, though it does lack some of the macro level, results-oriented reporting that would really tie together an understanding of email newsletters. Many of Nielson's detailed critiques are completely worthwhile as a set of do's and don'ts when devising an email newsletter strategy.

I would challenge Nielson, however, to tie his research on the frequency of email newsletters to actual voter behavior. I think that the American public generally accepts the temporary nature of political campaigns, and as a result understands that for a brief period of time every couple of years, they are going to have to tolerate the marketing efforts of political candidates entering their TVs, radios, and email boxes.

The frequency graph is telling. It indicates that the Bush team had a frequency strategy, while the Kerry team was a little more chaotic.

With email newsletters the topic of focus this week, there are a number of other things to consider that may help fill in the forest for anyone stuck in Nielson's trees, including the role of official newsletters in benefiting incumbents, CRM systems, privacy, and microtargeting.

Emoticons

The internet can be used to inspire. Can it engulf with emotion? Peter C. made the point in one of our earlier classes that the prevailing advantage of television advertising is its ability to evoke emotion.

It's tough to get away from the perception that the internet is a medium that conveys the message by text and the emotion by emoticons. The growing access to broadband has made multimedia distribution more realistic, with music, video and animation all working together through the internet to make an impact on the end user. Soon, multimedia will bring the internet to parity with television.

The real potential for the internet to exceed the emotional power of television is through interactivity. A give and take process, run against dynamic scripts, can build a crescendo of emotion that each member of the target audience is individually invested in. This would be a major new shift in the ability to connect with voters.

Globalization?

527s, created by the need for soft money to find a home, played a highly influential and involved role in the 2004 Presidential campaign.

Foreign contributions have long been prohibited by the regulatory apparatus that shapes American political fundraising activity.

There is an understanding (reflected in pending legislation banning donations by foreign nationals to 527s) that the law needs to be consistent in its prohibition of foreign influence on political activity.

The Clinton scandals of the late '90s were appalling examples of foreign involvement in our campaign process. It isn't the only recent example, as MoveOn.org and Wesley Clark were each briefly embroiled in controversy in 2003.

But is it advisable in today's networked world to firewall foreign contributions? Is it even possible? Global challenges inspire global passion. Is it right to exclude foreign nationals as well as foreign Nations?

For a country that largely believes in free trade, and was built on the free exchange of ideas, it is an interesting dilemma. Global terrorism, poverty, HIV/AIDS certainly pay no attention to borders.

Watch Carefully

Last week, the House passed out of Committee campaign finance-related legislation. Interesting provisions include a ban on donations by foreign nationals to 527 organizations, new reporting requirements for 527s, and a clarifying definition of "public communication".

The bill applies much needed sunshine to 527s and their contributors, and makes a clear prohibition on foreign donations. But it leaves the influential groups free to operate as is their right under the first amendment. Progress.

The provision of greatest impact applies to the internet. In the definition of "Public Communication" under governing law, the bill adds: "Such term shall not include communications over the internet." Broad. Definitive. The kind of language that, if signed into law, will allow the internet to be the alpha medium of political activity.

Voter Vault

The Republican strategy in the 2004 Presidential Election focused on using technological tools and traditional marketing plans to establish central command and control functions that directed the efforts of volunteers on the ground. It was a “centralized localization” strategy modeled after Amway and supported by vast amounts of data and new technologies.

The Amway strategy involved a cascading torrent of volunteers, from region, to state, to county, to precinct. The volunteers on the ground floor registered voters, talked with their neighbors, and gathered information. Ground level volunteers then transmitted all of this data upstream to campaign headquarters, where it was added to the Republican National Committee’s Voter Vault database.

Work on the Voter Vault database began in the mid-1990’s and it was not until 2002 that it became operational in the field. The RNC system remains years ahead of the DNC.

Although neither party organization is willing to reveal much about their databases (the DNC database system equivalent is called Demzilla/DataMart), published reports indicate that Voter Vault combines publicly available data, such as voter registration and political contributions, with consumer data and personal information gathered from phone calls and door-to-door canvassing. All data in Voter Vault is continuously updated, and because the database records information in a common format and utilizes a web interface, it is universally accessible online to all elements of the coordinated campaign effort.

Seat 29E

Stink Shield

This just needed to be posted for anyone who hadn't yet seen it...

JesseNet

Jesse Ventura's gubernatorial bid in Minnesota was a watershed moment for use of the internet in a political campaign. Running as a third party candidate, Ventura relied heavily on a younger, anti-establishment demographic to get elected. In the initial stages of the campaign, Ventura did not even have a bricks and mortar campaign office. Instead, he used the internet as an organizing and fundraising tool. His success on the internet allowed him to build up a traditional campaign establishment, and his online presence remained a key element of his strategy once the campaign had solid footing. His online effort buttressed a relative lack of resources by allowing him to reach voters (and his targeted demographic) in an effective and low cost manner.

A classic insurgent campaign, Ventura's message and targeted audience were symbiotic with the people he reached online, and the organizing and fundraising impact of his online strategy was crucial to his election.

Online Fundraising: A Field of Dreams?

Most Americans don't contribute to political campaigns. In 2004, a highly energized and record setting presidential election saw less than 600,000 citizens contribute $200 or more across all of the candidates. There are 296,324,505 Americans. The intrigue about online fundraising is the possibility that huge numbers of previously unengaged citizens will use the internet to cough up cash. The idea is that small donations, if flowing in high enough volume, can be very powerful.

Though it is a new frontier, online fundraising is not a Field of Dreams. You can't just build it and expect them to come. Citizens must first be engaged in the political process, and then in the candidate him/herself before there is much chance they will open their wallets. That's why fundraising, particularly online, must be integrated with internet campaign strategy in a way that is engaging, energizing, and appeals to as many people as possible. It is also crucial to incubate prospective voters (i.e. everyone who visits the site) through quality relationship management so that hesitant contributors can be brought along to the confirmation page at a later visit.

An Opposition Party?

It's been awhile since the Democratic Party has been out of power in Washington, DC, but there doesn't seem to be a strong indication that they have embraced the idea of being the Opposition Party. That is a tough hump to get over. It took decades for Republicans toiling in the minority to reach the self-discovery phase that ultimately provided the ideological foundation for the Republican Revolution in 1994.

A true opposition movement is what is required to overturn a solid Republican majority in both houses of Congress. The internet culture embraces an anti-establishment, power-of-the-people philosophy that may be harnessed for political gain by a true opposition party intent on changing the way business is done in Washington. A few progressive organizations on the left understand this dynamic, and have been successful in attracting support (see MoveOn), though their support is not broad based. An intraparty struggle over the direction of the Democratic Party has left it listless and incoherent in its opposition. Rest assured, Republicans will use this to paint their opponents as obstructionists with no ideas or alternatives. Not a recipe for short term success.


Not Getting the Job Done

The Golden Mouse

We touched a little bit upon the differences between strategic internet plans for challengers and incumbents.

Incumbents have always had a distinct advantage, from name recognition to franking privileges. The internet and websites provide incumbents with huge advantages by way of generating data and opening meaningful lines of communication to constituents.

Official in nature, Congressional web sites are first and foremost informational, and they lack the onus on fundraising that is present on campaign sites. If managed correctly, however, an official site enables Members of Congress and Senators to gather email addresses, phone numbers, mailing addresses, and issues of interest for countless constituents.

The Congressional Management Foundation's Congress Online Project provides best practices for Congressional web sites. Every couple of years they come out with the "Golden Mouse" awards, presented to the best web sites in the House and Senate. This may be a good resource for anyone putting together a strategic plan for an incumbent.

Not That I Visit the Huffington Post, But...

There was a very interesting piece by former Colorado Senator Gary Hart on the disintegration of the traditional party system of politics. An astute analysis, I thought. The point is that the world has changed so fast and so dramatically that old structures for understanding and operating within the world are fast becoming anachronistic.

Evolving and dynamic coalitions of interest meet the needs of today's active citizenry much better than rigid party doctrine. As connectivity increases, so will the ease with which citizens join to advance a specific cause or interest.

One of the values of the major national Parties is their ability to exert a moderating influence on the political debate. But recently both the Republican and Democratic parties have veered fringe due to the disproportionate influence of the wingnuts on each side.

If this erosion of moderating influence continues, the respective "bases" will be all that is left. Not that there is anything wrong with that. But it would certainly be a far cry from the party machines of previous centuries.

Vous les idiots contemptable prendrez votre direction du Politburo et l'aimerez

You contemtable idiots will take your direction from the Politburo and like it. I've been asking anyone who would indulge me, or who might have an understanding of the dynamics, why I should ever have wanted the people of France or the Netherlands to ratify the EU Constitution.

I haven't found someone able to convince me that it is a good thing for citizens of these countries to empower a bureaucratic elite light years removed from their daily concerns or any meaningful accountability.

The EU trend, which to date has been in favor of consolidating power in Brussels, may be in for a reversal. The individual western European has grown rightfully accustomed to self determination and a power to do something about perceived problems. The power of the individual pervades society and culture and has only grown with the internet. However, this social and cultural trend runs completely contrary to the political trend of the last 5 years that has moved the levers of power farther and farther from the individual.

So maybe the political leadership in Europe can ramrod this Constitution through. The recent referendae are a clear setback, but in all fairness, it is the first time the people were asked for their opinion.

Pervert of the Day

24 hour news networks are reaching to fill their coverage. Scott Peterson, runaway brides, the vaseline card in the Jacko case...

Isn't there demand out there for actual news, maybe from a legitimate (and named) primary source or two? The problem with the internet is its vastness. There are too many sites and resources to dig through. A lot of information is bogus. The blending of opinion into news is not restricted to one medium. It is a pervasive trend that subjugates reality in the interest of entertainment.

Because the internet is constantly expanding, it is imperative that surfers be able to sift through the garbage and find reliable and truthful accounts of world events. As British Boy so aptly described in his account of coverage in the DailyKos, the Bloggers who fancy themselves watchdogs of the MSM may be a fox in sheep's clothing.

R U READY

I never really "got" text messaging. Too much work. The concept of m-commerce, though, and the power of reaching individuals anywhere, anytime I can get. I've seen the CrackBerry epidemic ravage Washington, DC. The Capital (and Capitol) is in the throes of addiction. I carry my work BlackBerry and can tell you just how possible it is to be reached anywhere, anytime.

What you see in China, the streets of Cairo and rural South Africa, is the use of SMS to organize, direct and orchestrate activity. The technology and consumer market in the USA allow organizers and advertisers to build on these SMS tactics and dive much deeper into m-commerce.

The convergence of voice, email, SMS, web, and mobile computing onto one simple device makes that particular device indispensable to the individual carrying it. Stands to reason that a corporation or campaign would like to have its product or a Get Out To Vote message get through to that device.

Trust Me

It wouldn't be a New Media if the internet and World Wide Web worked the same way as every other media. The challenges of campaigning in the New Media should be faced with the understanding that the marketing approach for television/radio is largely incongruent with what is necessary to be successful on the internet.

Seth Godin managed to distill the paradigm shift required for success on the internet in his work Permission Marketing: Turning Strangers Into Friends And Friends Into Customers. Seth was a little overzealous in predicting the speed and depth of the permission marketing impact, but history will prove his concepts prescient.

Marketers and major corporations are fast catching on to the theory of Trust-Based Marketing, as supported by Glen Urban's extensive research. Campaigns are at their essence a marketing exercise, and future successful campaigns will leverage the lessons of corporate e-marketing.

Campaign internet strategy should take advantage of the interactive tools and behavior available only through the New Media, and should leave the sledgehammer of one-way communication to their television and radio ad buys. Howard Dean's Open Source strategy in 2004 demonstrated the power of Trust-Based Marketing to energize and directly engage the electorate. His and other candidates' use of the internet to maintain and foster a base of support through Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems is another example of corporate e-marketing best practices applied to the political field. (Note to incumbents: A CRM system based on the proprietary data gleaned from your work in office is the strongest present day advantage of incumbency.)

Go to school on the commercial sector. The New Media differs from the Old, and there are plenty of examples of how to use it effectively to spur action, engender loyalty, and better meet the needs of both the candidate and voter.